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1

woman who promised to help obtain a green card for Silvia. However, while
holding Silvia’s immigration documents, Marisol demanded money and
suggested that Silvia “‘sleep with men in the street’ in order to get her
2
immigration documents back.” Feeling she had no other choice, Silvia worked as
a prostitute for two-and-a-half years, living with her captors and giving them all
3
the money she made. During that period, Silvia acquired a staggering eighty-six
convictions for prostitution or loitering for the purpose of engaging in
4
prostitution. “[S]ometimes [Sylvia] would just go up to police officers and ask
5
them to take her in. . . . [B]eing in jail was preferable to working on the street.”
6
Though Silvia encountered law-enforcement officers on a regular basis (at least
eighty-six times in a two-and-a-half year period), those officers never recognized
7
her as a victim of human trafficking. Not only did law enforcement fail to
recognize her as a victim of crime, but they further victimized her by arresting
8
her, labeling her a criminal, and saddling her with a criminal record.
It is not uncommon for law-enforcement officers to arrest and prosecute
human-trafficking victims for engaging in criminal activity when that activity is a
9
direct result of their trafficking situation. G.M., for another example, was abused
and trafficked over an eleven-year period, resulting in six criminal convictions—
10
all directly resulting from her trafficking situation. G.M. and her abuser were
dating, and only after they married did the abuse begin—he beat and raped her,
1. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. For the purpose of this Comment, “law-enforcement officer” refers to any officer or employee of a
police or sheriff’s department or any peace officer.
7. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Law enforcement never recognized Silvia’s trafficking situation. Id. It
was not until Silvia filed a court motion under Section 440.10(1)(i) of New York Criminal Procedure Law that
the criminal-justice system recognized her situation as trafficking and vacated her convictions for prostitution
and loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. Id. at 569–70; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (allowing a sex-trafficking victim to seek vacation of prior
prostitution convictions, provided the crimes were committed as a result of then-present sex trafficking); infra
Part III.D (providing an overview and analysis of the New York law).
8. See Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (Silvia had been convicted eighty-six times.).
9. See, e.g., id. (vacating the convictions of a trafficking victim arrested for prostitution and loitering for
the purpose of prostitution); see also New York v. Doe, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
(vacating the convictions of a trafficked teen arrested multiple times for loitering for the purpose of
prostitution); New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (vacating the convictions of a
trafficking victim arrested for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution); Susan Kelleher, Teen
Missing After Testimony Against Pimp, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 20, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com
/html/localnews/2013719994_missing20m.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing a teen
arrested multiple times for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution); Barbara Goldberg, New
Yorker Expunges Prostitution Record Under Trafficking Law, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/article/011/09/21/ussextrafficking-idUSTRE78K7Q320110921 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(trafficked teen arrested multiple times for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution).
10. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 762–63.
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imprisoned her, watched her every move, and eventually forced her into
11
prostitution. G.M. complied with her husband’s demands because, in addition to
his history of abuse, he threatened to harm or kill her children, who remained in
12
her native Dominican Republic. She escaped to the Dominican Republic on two
13
separate occasions, but returned to the United States each time with her abuser.
After successfully escaping for good, G.M. still had a criminal record as a result
of her sex-trafficking situation, and her employer of five years terminated her
14
when they discovered her convictions.
Minors arrested for prostitution are likewise further victimized by the
criminal-justice system. For example, the Seattle Police Department first arrested
Kelsey Emily Collins for prostitution when she was a sophomore in high
15
school. Kelsey amassed multiple arrests and criminal charges before a police
16
officer recognized the signs of sex trafficking. Similarly, Ms. Johnson was only
17
thirteen years old when she began prostituting for her trafficker-boyfriend. Over
a six-year period, Ms. Johnson was convicted of prostitution three times, and the
18
arresting officers never recognized her as a trafficking victim.
These cases indicate, first, that human-trafficking victims encounter law19
enforcement officers during the officers’ day-to-day duties. This contact creates
an opportunity for law-enforcement officers to recognize the individual as a
victim, interrupt the trafficking cycle, obtain social services for the victim, and
prosecute the real criminal: the trafficker. Second, these cases indicate that lawenforcement officers not only fail to recognize human-trafficking victims as
victims rather than criminals, but also subject victims to criminal treatment,
complete with arrests, convictions, and a criminal record—what this Comment
20
refers to as “dual victimization.” “[T]rafficking victims should not be punished
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. G.M. returned to the United States each time due to her abuser’s coercive tactics: the first time
after promising he would change, and the second time when he threatened “to harm a close family friend.” Id.
14. Id. at 763. While G.M. successfully challenged her termination, her criminal record would
nonetheless pose a hurdle for future employment. Id. The New York Criminal Court took this burden into
consideration in vacating G.M.’s record pursuant to Section 440.10(1)(i) of New York Criminal Procedure Law.
Id.; see also infra Part III.D (discussing the New York law).
15. Kelleher, supra note 9.
16. Id. Oregon, which treats any minor engaging in the sex trade as a victim of crime, recognizes
Kelsey’s status as that of a victim, rather than a criminal guilty of prostitution. OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(d)
(2011) (classifying prostitution of a minor as child abuse).
17. Goldberg, supra note 9.
18. See id. (explaining that it was a customer who helped Ms. Johnson escape).
19. Robert Moossy, Sex Trafficking: Identifying Cases and Victims, 262 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 2, 3
(2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225759.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
“Most cases prosecuted by DOJ to date have been identified by line-level police officers who encounter sex
traffickers or their victims during the normal course of operations: during routine traffic stops, on domestic
violence calls, while inspecting liquor licenses, and when intercepting truant children.” Id.
20. For the purpose of this Comment, “dual victimization” refers to when the criminal-justice system
fails to recognize human-trafficking victims as victims and treats them as criminals instead. This criminal
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for crimes that are a direct result of being trafficked . . . . They should be treated
21
22
as victims.” While recognizing human trafficking is difficult, if lawenforcement officers proactively look for it, they are more likely to recognize
victims of human trafficking. In turn, law-enforcement officers will be more
likely to prevent dual victimization by treating those identified victims as victims
rather than as criminals.
Law-enforcement officers’ failure to recognize human trafficking does not
indicate a failure to maintain high-level job performance, and this Comment does
not assert any wrongdoing by these individuals. Rather, as victims are unlikely to
23
seek help or be forthcoming to law enforcement about their situations, it is
imperative that law-enforcement officers proactively look for signs of human
trafficking. Law-enforcement officers must also know what social services a
victim will need to permanently escape his or her trafficking situation.
Misunderstanding abounds regarding human trafficking in the United
24
States. In jurisdictions devoid of human-trafficking training for lawenforcement officers, it is even more likely that an officer will fail to recognize
25
the signs and treat the victim as a criminal rather than as a victim of crime. In
other words, absent trafficking training, it is more likely that a victim, who could
have had meaningful contact with the law leading to freedom and prosecution of
the real criminal (the trafficker), will be further victimized by the criminal-justice
system. At this point, the opportunity to interrupt the trafficking cycle is lost,
what this Comment refers to as “slipping through the cracks” of the criminal26
justice system.
This Comment asserts the number of trafficking victims charged and
prosecuted for crimes indicates a systemic failure within the criminal-justice
system to recognize human trafficking and its players, and that the states should
implement statutory changes, including mandatory training for law-enforcement
officers.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of human trafficking in the
United States. In particular, Part II dispels popular misconceptions regarding

treatment—often including arrests, charges, prosecutions, and criminal records—further victimizes a humantrafficking victim: a dual victimization.
21. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 36 (2007), available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/82902.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
22. See infra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing trafficking victims).
23. See id.
24. See infra Part II.A (dispelling popular myths about trafficking).
25. Karen J. Bachar, Combating Human Trafficking at the State and Local Levels, 262 NAT’L INST. OF
JUST. J. 8 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225759.pdf (citation omitted) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
26. For the purpose of this Comment, “slipping through the cracks” refers to when a human-trafficking
victim comes into contact with a law-enforcement officer, and although there is an opportunity to recognize the
trafficking and provide victim assistance, the officer fails to do so and the opportunity to interrupt the
trafficking cycle is lost.
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human trafficking, including that which is most dangerous to trafficking victims:
that modern-day slavery (human trafficking) does not exist, or, if it does, that it is
27
an issue unique to underdeveloped nations and not present in the United States.
Part II also examines why trafficking is so difficult to recognize and why victims
28
are unlikely to seek help from law enforcement. Part III surveys how
jurisdictions respond when a trafficking victim is charged with a crime
committed due to a trafficking situation. Most jurisdictions do not provide formal
29
relief for a criminally prosecuted human-trafficking victim. Some states allow
victims to claim human trafficking as an affirmative defense to criminal
30
charges, while New York allows victims to seek vacation of prior convictions
31
on a showing of trafficking.
Finally, Part IV recommends a three-part statutory response to dual
victimization: (1) mandating human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement
officers; (2) including human trafficking as an affirmative defense to crimes
committed due to the trafficking situation; and (3) allowing vacation of prior
convictions on a showing of human trafficking. While this Comment argues that
all jurisdictions should enact these three recommendations, this Comment
focuses primarily on preventing dual victimization before it occurs, and only
secondarily on providing relief to trafficking victims who slip through the cracks.
Therefore, Part IV focuses on requiring human-trafficking training for law32
enforcement officers, using mandatory domestic-violence training as a model.

27. See Myths and Misconceptions, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/humantrafficking/overview/myths-and-misconceptions (last visited July 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (providing an overview of commonly held human-trafficking myths).
28. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3–6.
29. As this Comment goes to press, nine states had provided some form of recourse for a criminally
prosecuted trafficking victim. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing an affirmative
defense); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011) (providing an affirmative defense); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.325(4) (West 2009) (providing an affirmative defense); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis
2012) (providing an affirmative defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005) (providing an affirmative
defense); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (allowing a victim to seek
vacation of judgment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012) (providing an affirmative
defense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011) (providing an affirmative defense to an actor who
was “the victim of conduct that constitutes an offense under” section 20A.02 of the Texas Penal Code, which
lists the elements of trafficking of persons); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011) (providing an
affirmative defense “for any offense committed as a direct result of the violation of [section 940.302(2) of the
Wisconsin Criminal Code],” which describes human trafficking).
30. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m).
31. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i).
32. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519 (West 2012) (requiring police officers receive training in the
“nature and extent of domestic violence,” how to recognize domestic violence, and issues commonly related to
a domestic-violence situation).
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II. HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES
33

As a “hot button topic,” people are more aware that human trafficking exists
34
and that it exists in the United States. However, common-held beliefs about
human trafficking are often mere myths, which are problematic for combating
35
dual victimization. Furthermore, even the most well-informed law-enforcement
officer is still encumbered by the inherent difficulties in recognizing human
36
trafficking.
A. Overview of Human Trafficking
Human trafficking is “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision,
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt
37
bondage, or slavery.” Human trafficking is an umbrella term for “when one
person obtains or holds another person in compelled service,” including, but not
38
39
40
limited to, forced labor, sex trafficking, and bonded labor. This Comment
uses the umbrella term “human trafficking” to include any number of trafficking
41
classifications.
42
Despite its status as a “hot button topic,” misunderstanding about human
43
trafficking in the United States abounds. These misunderstandings are
33. Allison Navarro, Human Trafficking: A Hot-Button Topic, UNITED NATIONS ASS’N OF SAN DIEGO
(United Nations Ass’n and the Business Council of the United Nations, San Diego Chapter, San Diego, CA)
Summer 2009, at 9 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 372 (2011), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/ [hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011] (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (“The United States is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women,
and children subjected to forced labor, debt bondage, document servitude, and sex trafficking.”).
35. See POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (“To effectively combat human trafficking, each of us needs to
have a clear ‘lens’ that helps us understand what human trafficking is. When this lens is clouded or biased by
certain persistent misconceptions about the definition of trafficking, our ability to respond to the crime is
reduced.”).
36. See infra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human trafficking).
37. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 8.
38. Id. at 7. Forced labor or involuntary servitude “may result when unscrupulous employers exploit
workers made more vulnerable by high rates of unemployment, poverty, crime, discrimination, corruption,
political conflict, or cultural acceptance of the practice.” Id.
39. Id. Sex trafficking occurs “[w]hen an adult is coerced, forced, or deceived into prostitution—or
maintained in prostitution through coercion . . . .” Id.
40. Id. at 7–8. Bonded labor or debt bondage occurs when “traffickers or recruiters unlawfully exploit an
initial debt the worker assumed as part of the terms of employment.” Id.
41. This Comment disproportionately focuses on sex trafficking, even though the proposed statutory
changes are to combat dual victimization for all human-trafficking victims. This is because certain statutes
described herein apply only to sex-trafficking victims. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i)
(McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (permitting vacation of judgment for prostitution or loitering for the purpose of
prostitution only, effectively precludes many human-trafficking victims from seeking this relief).
42. Navarro, supra note 33.
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especially problematic if held by a law-enforcement officer. For example, human
trafficking does not require “physical restraint, physical force, or physical
44
bondage.” A law-enforcement officer under the mistaken assumption that
trafficking requires physical restraint will undoubtedly fail to recognize a
trafficking victim walking freely about. Another commonly held
misunderstanding is that victims of crime generally seek assistance from law
45
enforcement. However, due to distrust, fear, or the fact that a trafficking victim
may engage in criminal activity as part of his or her trafficking situation,
46
trafficking victims often do not seek help.
Perpetuation of these
misunderstandings exacerbates the already tremendous difficulty in recognizing
47
human trafficking and its players. Therefore, it is imperative that lawenforcement officers proactively look for signs indicative of human trafficking.
B. The Difficulty in Recognizing Human Trafficking
Human trafficking is difficult to recognize for many reasons. Human
trafficking is often “a hidden crime,” and sex trafficking is even more so, often
48
“perpetuated in alleys, brothels and illicit massage parlors.” Also, victims may
travel between jurisdictions, leaving little time for law enforcement to recognize
49
the crime and its players and to prosecute accordingly. Furthermore,
recognizing an individual engaging in criminal activity as a victim of crime
rather than as a perpetrator of crime is counterintuitive to the criminal-justice
system. This Comment acknowledges the difficulty for a law-enforcement officer
to simultaneously view a trafficked person as both a criminal committing an
offense and a victim compelled by a human-trafficking situation to commit that
offense.
In addition to being difficult to recognize, human-trafficking victims do not
50
often seek help and may even hide the reality of their situation. It is not
51
uncommon for trafficking victims to protect their traffickers, at least initially.

43. See generally POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (providing an overview of commonly held
misconceptions about human trafficking in the United States).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See infra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human trafficking).
48. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3.
49. E.g., TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 37. But see id. at 8 (“A victim need
not be physically transported from one location to another in order for the crime to fall within these
definitions.”).
50. See POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (“Victims of human trafficking often do not immediately seek
help or self-identify as victims of crime due to a variety of factors, including lack of trust, self-blame, or
specific instructions by the traffickers regarding how to behave when talking to law enforcement or social
services.”).
51. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that a victim may have an emotional attachment to or love
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Trafficking “victims are often highly traumatized, having lived through months
or even years of brutality . . . . In some instances, victims develop survival or
coping mechanisms that manifest as distrust, deceptiveness and an unwillingness
52
to accept assistance.” Through force and humiliation, traffickers control their
victims to convince them that “the police will not help them and will be
interested only in arresting the victims for [crimes committed] or for being
53
54
undocumented.” A victim may fear deportation if undocumented, may have an
55
emotional connection to the trafficker, or may fear retaliation from the
56
trafficker. Furthermore, as a trafficking victim’s previous encounter with law
enforcement may have involved an arrest, a trafficking victim may distrust law
57
enforcement.
III. FAILING TO RECOGNIZE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS: A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
58

While human trafficking is a crime under federal law, failing to recognize
the crime and its players may lead to prosecuting the victim rather than the
59
trafficker. When a human-trafficking victim commits a crime due to a thenpresent trafficking situation, there is a vast discrepancy in jurisdictional
60
responses. Ideally, the law-enforcement officer who encounters a trafficking
victim would recognize the situation and treat the individual as a victim rather
61
than as a criminal. A law-enforcement officer is more likely to recognize human
trafficking—thereby more likely to interrupt the trafficking cycle—if he or she
62
has had human-trafficking training. However, if an officer fails to recognize a
for his or her trafficker, or may fear retaliation if the victim seeks help from the police).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 6–7.
54. Id. at 5. For example, fearing deportation, Silvia Gonzalez voluntarily handed over her identifying
documents to her trafficker, relying on the trafficker’s promise to obtain a green card for her. New York v.
Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
55. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5; see also, e.g., New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct.
2011) (G.M.’s husband trafficked her.); Kelleher, supra note 9 (Kelsey Collins’ boyfriend trafficked her.);
Goldberg, supra note 9 (Ms. Johnson’s boyfriend trafficked her.).
56. Moossy, supra note 19, at 6. Victims may fear retaliation because the “[t]rafficker may have
threatened to harm them or their families if they are truthful.” Id.
57. See id. at 4–5 (providing an example of a sex-trafficking victim fearing arrest for prostitution if he or
she seeks help).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–96 (2006).
59. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567; G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761; Kelleher, supra note 9; Goldberg,
supra note 9 (Silvia, G.M., Kelsey Collins, and Ms. Johnson were all prosecuted for crimes committed due to
their status as human-trafficking victims.).
60. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing an affirmative defense for a
trafficking victim charged with a crime); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp.
2012) (allowing vacation of judgment for certain crimes committed by a trafficking victim).
61. A dual victimization.
62. See POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 27 (“To effectively combat human trafficking, [law-enforcement
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trafficking situation and arrests the victim, a majority of jurisdictions do not
63
provide any remedy to the victim. Some states allow victims to raise human
64
trafficking as an affirmative defense. New York takes a unique approach and
allows victims to seek vacation of a prior conviction on a showing of then65
present trafficking.
While providing an affirmative defense or the option to seek vacation of a
prior conviction are important statutory steps, either form of relief is too narrow
66
to apply to all trafficking victims. Furthermore, neither form of relief prevents
dual victimization; both an affirmative defense and vacation of prior convictions
67
provide relief after the dual victimization has already occurred.
A. Federal Anti-Trafficking Efforts
This Comment focuses on the systemic failure to recognize human
trafficking at the state level. However, federal measures provide a baseline in
combating human trafficking in the United States; therefore, it would be remiss
68
to exclude them. Federal law criminalizes human trafficking. The Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000, reauthorized in 2008, creates victim support
69
programs and task forces to combat human trafficking. The Department of
70
Justice (DOJ) established trafficking task forces in forty-two jurisdictions. As
the DOJ task forces investigate trafficking cases to provide victim support, task
71
forces are a means of combating trafficking generally, thereby rescuing victims
officers need] to have a clear ‘lens’ that helps [them] understand what human trafficking is.”). It is unlikely lawenforcement agencies will train officers on human trafficking, as very few jurisdictions require it. See infra Part
IV.A (discussing the statutes mandating human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers).
63. As this Comment goes to press, nine states provided some form of recourse for a criminally
prosecuted trafficking victim. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (providing an affirmative defense); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011) (providing an affirmative defense); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West
2009) (providing an affirmative defense); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012) (providing an
affirmative defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005) (providing an affirmative defense); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (allowing a victim to seek vacation of judgment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
748(D) (West Supp. 2012) (providing an affirmative defense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011)
(providing an affirmative defense); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011) (providing an affirmative
defense).
64. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m).
65. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i).
66. See infra Part III.C (discussing affirmative defense to charges); Part III.D (discussing vacation of
prior convictions).
67. See infra Part III.E (discussing how either response fails to combat dual victimization, but provides
an important form of relief for human-trafficking victims).
68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–96 (2006).
69. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–12 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
70. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5.
71.

See id. (stating that DOJ task forces combine local, state, and federal law enforcement to proactively
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before they are further victimized by the criminal-justice system. While many
states provide additional measures to combat trafficking, victims still slip through
72
the cracks.
B. Mandatory Human-Trafficking Training for Law-Enforcement Officers
A recent study revealed that, generally, law-enforcement officers could not
identify different types of human trafficking or its elements, and “could not . . .
73
[d]istinguish trafficking from smuggling.” This indicates a failure to adequately
train law-enforcement officers to recognize trafficking victims they may
encounter during their careers. In contrast, law-enforcement agencies that have a
74
human trafficking task force “are more likely to perceive human trafficking as a
problem in their communities and to have training, protocols and specialized
75
units of personnel devoted to investigating these cases.”
Human-trafficking victims typically encounter law-enforcement officers
76
during the officers’ day-to-day duties. Therefore, officers’ mere presence
provides a crucial opportunity to interrupt the trafficking cycle by recognizing
trafficking victims, facilitating victim rescue, potentially finding other trafficking
77
victims, and prosecuting the real criminal: the trafficker. With sex trafficking
specifically, “the trafficker must obtain a stream of paying clients . . . and provide
an array of new victims. Both these activities require traffickers to become more
78
‘public,’ providing opportunities for law enforcement to intervene.” As the
number of law-enforcement officers on the street at any given time is limited,
having officers who do not know how to recognize trafficking wastes this
precious resource.
It is imperative that law-enforcement officers are trained to recognize the
signs of human trafficking, know what to do when they encounter a suspected
trafficking victim or trafficker, and proactively look for trafficking in their
community. Failure to recognize the problem—which is more likely when the
79
law-enforcement officers have not received trafficking training —allows
trafficking victims to slip through the cracks. Silvia was convicted eighty-six

investigate cases and identify victims, which would effectively interrupt the trafficking cycle).
72. See supra Part I (providing several examples of human-trafficking victims prosecuted for crimes
committed due to a then-present trafficking situation).
73. Bachar, supra note 25.
74. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
75. Bachar, supra note 25.
76. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Bachar, supra note 25. This Comment does not allege any wrongdoing on behalf of law-enforcement
officers. Rather, this Comment seeks to expose a systemic failure to recognize trafficking victims as victims
rather than as criminals, and propose ways to combat this dual victimization.
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times without law enforcement recognizing her as a victim of crime; G.M. was
81
82
83
arrested six times; Kelsey Collins and Ms. Johnson were each arrested several
times without being recognized as victims, even though they were minors at the
time of their arrests.
84
As this Comment goes to press, only seven states require human-trafficking
85
training for law-enforcement officers. Of these states, some impose broad, nondescriptive obligations requiring merely that law-enforcement agencies provide a
86
training. In contrast, other states impose a descriptive list of topics that must be
covered during a mandatory human-trafficking training, such as Indiana’s
87
88
mandatory-training statute. As human trafficking involves complex issues, this
Comment argues that human-trafficking training must cover those issues in
detail, and that the mandatory-training statute must reflect the necessity of such
89
detail by itemizing a list of topics to be covered during this training. A
descriptive statute will protect against holding a superficial and uninformative
training merely to meet the minimum requirement of the statute. Furthermore, the
mobile nature of human trafficking also cautions against states enacting a nondescriptive statutes to ensure that law-enforcement officers respond to human
trafficking similarly regardless of jurisdiction.

80. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568–69 (Crim. Ct. 2011). Gonzalez was so desperate to
get off of the street, “sometimes she would just go up to police officers and ask them to take her in.” Id.
81. New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762 (Crim. Ct. 2011). As a result of her trafficker’s abuse,
G.M. visited the hospital for medical care. Id. That the hospital staff also failed to recognize G.M. as a
trafficking victim indicates a need for mandatory human-trafficking training for individuals in the medical field
and social services. However, this exceeds the scope of this Comment.
82. Kelleher, supra note 9. Unlike Gonzalez, G.M., and Ms. Johnson, a police officer eventually
recognized Kelsey Collins as a trafficking victim; however, she had multiple arrests prior to her meaningful
contact with law enforcement, leading to escape, albeit temporarily, from her trafficking situation. Id.
83. Goldberg, supra note 9.
84. California, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia.
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 80B.11(2)(e) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-52-3 (LexisNexis 2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55)
(West 2012).
86. See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (requiring law-enforcement officers to take a four-hour
training “including a review of the substance of” penal code sections defining human trafficking); see also VA.
CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55) (requiring a training “regarding the identification, investigation, and prosecution of
human trafficking offenses . . . ”).
87. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (requiring law-enforcement officers undergo training
examining “the human and sexual trafficking laws”; “[i]dentification of human and sexual trafficking”;
“[c]ommunicating with traumatized persons”; “[t]herapeutically appropriate investigative techniques”;
“[c]ollaboration with federal law enforcement officials”; “[r]ights of and protections afforded to victims”; and
“[t]he availability of community resources to assist human and sexual trafficking victims”).
88. Complex issues such as recognizing a trafficking situation, victims’ distrust of the criminal-justice
system, and what social services a victim will likely need to successfully escape the trafficking situation and
maintain freedom.
89. See supra note 87 (listing topics to be covered under Indiana’s human-trafficking training statute).
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Statutory training requirements set the minimum requirements, not the
90
maximum. Therefore, law-enforcement officers may undergo human-trafficking
training, through continuing education or an informal training, even though not
91
required by a majority of jurisdictions. As human trafficking is and has been a
92
“hot button topic,” it is likely that many law-enforcement officers receive
human-trafficking training while not statutorily mandated to do so. However, as
most law-enforcement officers cannot recognize the difference between the types
of human trafficking or the difference between smuggling and human
93
trafficking, this informal training is clearly insufficient.
Mandatory training will give law-enforcement officers the tools they need to
recognize trafficking victims, thereby preventing dual victimization. However,
no amount of training will provide adequate relief to those trafficking victims
94
who will inevitably slip through the cracks. Therefore, it is imperative that in
addition to mandating human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers,
95
jurisdictions also provide relief to those victims who slip through the cracks.
C. Affirmative Defense to Criminal Charges
The Center for Women Policy Studies recommends all jurisdictions make
96
human trafficking an affirmative defense to criminal charges. An affirmative
defense defeats the “prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the
97
complaint are true.” Therefore, the defendant does not challenge committing the
98
crime or its elements, but rather “seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it.” Unlike
a simple defense, the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish the specific
99
facts to mitigate the charges. Common affirmative defenses to criminal charges
100
include insanity and self-defense.

90. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-6-207 (West 2007) (“The minimum standards in this part
concerning peace officer qualifications and training do not preclude counties, cities, or towns from establishing
standards higher than the minimum standards contained in this part.”).
91. Id.; supra note 85 and accompanying text.
92. Navarro, supra note 33.
93. Bachar, supra note 25.
94. As human trafficking is inherently difficult to recognize, even the finest trained individuals may fail
to recognize a trafficking situation. See supra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human
trafficking).
95. See infra Part III.C (describing human trafficking as an affirmative defense to criminal charges); Part
III.D (describing vacation of prior judgment based on then-present human trafficking).
96. NAT’L INST. ON STATE POLICY ON TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN & GIRLS, RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS 4 (2005), available at http://www.
centerwomenpolicy.org/pdfs/TraffickingResourceGuide.pdf [hereinafter MODEL PROVISIONS] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).
98. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 182 (2008) (citations omitted).
99. Id.
100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 97.
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As this Comment goes to press, eight states have some type of affirmative
102
defense for crimes committed by a trafficking victim. Of these eight states,
Alabama, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Texas, and Wisconsin allow an
affirmative defense to criminal charges if the defendant was a trafficking victim
when the crime was committed, and the crime was a direct result of the
103
defendant’s trafficking situation. Of those six states, Iowa and Minnesota more
narrowly require not only that the defendant committed the charged crime or
crimes during a trafficking situation, but also did so under force or threat of
104
force. New Jersey and Oklahoma are broader, requiring neither direct relation
between the crime committed and the trafficking situation, nor a force or threat of
105
force requirement. Rather, these two states merely require that the defendant
106
was a human-trafficking victim when he or she committed the crime.
Additionally, of these eight states providing an affirmative defense, the
majority only apply the defense to prostitution and prostitution-related
107
offenses, thereby providing a remedy to sex-trafficking victims only. In
contrast, only Iowa, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin provide an affirmative defense for
crimes committed as a direct result of a then-present human-trafficking
108
situation.
A jurisdiction providing an affirmative defense as a form of relief for a
human-trafficking victim facing criminal charges may implement a broad or
109
narrow defense, depending on its statutory drafting. For example, the Center
for Women Policy Studies proposes language that would include any crime

101. Alabama, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin.
102. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011).
103. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m).
104. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4).
105. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D).
106. Id.
107. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d).
108. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m).
Therefore, had Silvia Gonzales been in one of these three states, she would have also had an affirmative defense
to her conviction for resisting arrest, in addition to her prostitution-related offenses. See New York v. Gonzalez,
927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (stating that, under New York law, Gonzalez had no redress for her
resisting arrest conviction).
109. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e), and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (providing that a
defendant must show he or she was a trafficking victim when the crime was committed to successfully raise an
affirmative defense), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3, and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (requiring a
defendant show three elements to successfully raise an affirmative defense: (1) the defendant was a trafficking
victim when he or she committed the crime; (2) the crime was directly related to that trafficking situation; and
(3) the defendant acted under force or threat of force).
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committed while “the defendant was a victim of human trafficking,” thereby
encompassing all crimes committed during a trafficking situation—even if those
111
crimes did not stem directly from that trafficking situation. However, such
statutes may be drafted narrowly as well, such as Iowa Code section 710A.3,
requiring that the defendant’s crime stem directly from the human-trafficking
situation and that the defendant commit the crime under force or threat of force in
112
order for the affirmative defense to apply.
While an affirmative defense certainly provides judicial relief for criminally
113
prosecuted trafficking victims, this form of relief is far from perfect. By
limiting the crimes to which the affirmative defense applies to prostitution and
loitering for the purpose of prostitution, the majority of the jurisdictions
providing this relief effectively limit its availability to sex-trafficking victims,
114
rather than to the broader classification of human-trafficking victims.
Furthermore, even if this relief is available to a sex-trafficking victim for
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution, the defendant may have
other charges to which the affirmative defense does not apply, even if the
115
defendant proves a then-present sex-trafficking situation. Additionally, the
Iowa and Minnesota statutes are even more limited; not only do they require that
the defendant committed the crime or crimes during a trafficking situation, but
also under force or threat of force, thereby imposing another obstacle to
116
successfully raising an affirmative defense.
Some of the barriers to recognizing human-trafficking victims generally and
sex-trafficking victims in particular also present a barrier to a victim claiming the
117
defense. For example, trafficking victims may have feelings for, be in a
110. MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 96, at 4. Proposed language: “It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution for a criminal violation that, during the time of the alleged commission of the offense, the defendant
was a victim of human trafficking.” Id.
111. Id.
112. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3.
113. See infra notes 114–25 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of an affirmative defense
for crimes directly related to a trafficking situation).
114. Compare ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4), and
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e), and TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011) (limiting the applicability of the affirmative defense to prostitution and
loitering for the purpose of prostitution charges), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3, and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 748(D), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011) (containing no limit on what types of
crimes the affirmative defense applies to, provided the defendant was a human-trafficking victim at the crime’s
commission).
115. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (limiting the applicability of the affirmative
defense to prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution charges). For example, a victim like Sylvia
Gonzalez would be unable to raise an affirmative defense for resisting arrest, which was a direct result of her
then-present sex-trafficking situation, where the affirmative defense is limited to prostitution-related offenses.
New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
116. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4).
117. See supra Part II.B (indicating the inherent difficulties in recognizing trafficking victims).
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relationship with, or even be in love with their traffickers. In this case, claiming
the affirmative defense would force the defendant to incriminate the person they
119
love—the trafficker. Even if the trafficking victim has no feeling of intimacy
towards the trafficker, due to the coercion and fear the trafficker uses to control
trafficking victims, a trafficked person is not likely to be forthcoming and
120
implicate the trafficker as a criminal. Trafficking victims may also fear
retaliation from their traffickers if they were to claim trafficking as an affirmative
121
defense in court. Additionally, language barriers or misunderstandings about
individual rights may prevent a victim from claiming trafficking as an affirmative
122
defense.
123
More importantly, this form of relief does not combat dual victimization.
Rather, by the time this relief is available to a trafficking victim, the criminaljustice system already arrested, charged, and prosecuted the defendant as a
124
criminal rather than recognizing him or her as a victim of crime. Therefore,
while providing an affirmative defense for crimes committed while the defendant
was a trafficking victim is an important form of relief for when trafficking
125
victims slip through the cracks, it does not combat dual victimization.
D. Vacate Judgment upon a Showing of Trafficking
If a criminal defendant is unable or unwilling to raise an affirmative defense
126
for crimes committed due to a then-present human-trafficking situation, the
118. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5; TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 25; see also
New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762–63 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (G.M.’s husband trafficked her.); Kelleher,
supra note 9 (Kelsey Collins’ boyfriend trafficked her.); Goldberg, supra note 9 (Ms. Johnson’s boyfriend
trafficked her.).
119. Moossy, supra note 19, at 5; TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011, supra note 34, at 25; see also
G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 762–63; Kelleher, supra note 9; Goldberg, supra note 9.
120. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 5 (“[V]ictims develop survival or coping mechanisms that manifest
as distrust, deceptiveness and an unwillingness to accept assistance.”).
121. See id. at 6 (“[T]he trafficker may have threatened to harm them or their families if they are
truthful. This may lead victims to deceive law enforcement, especially early in the process.”).
122. See id. at 6–7 (providing that traffickers may tell their victims that if they try to go to the police for
help, the police will arrest them for prostitution or for being in the country illegally).
123. Of course, if a defendant successfully raises the affirmative defense, then the trafficking victim will
not be saddled with a criminal record. However, this Comment argues that even without a resulting criminal
record, being arrested as a criminal rather than recognized as a victim is sufficient to constitute dual
victimization.
124. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 182 (2008) (citations omitted) (stating that affirmative
defenses, like simple defenses, are raised during trial).
125. See id. (As a human trafficking victim raises an affirmative defense, if at all, during trial, dual
victimization has already occurred.).
126. It is unlikely a defendant could raise such an affirmative defense, because only a few jurisdictions
provide one. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011). Additionally, it is
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criminal-justice system saddles that trafficking victim with a criminal record in
127
all but one jurisdiction. In 2010, New York passed landmark legislation
allowing a sex-trafficking victim to seek vacation of prior convictions, provided
“the defendant’s participation in the offense was a result of having been a victim
128
of sex trafficking,” which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
129
evidence.
Additionally, New York recognizes any minor engaging in
130
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution as a trafficking victim.
131
To vacate a prior conviction is to invalidate the conviction. Therefore, the
timing for a vacation of judgment differs from an affirmative defense. An
affirmative defense is raised, if at all, during a defendant’s trial, and therefore,
132
before a conviction. Vacation of prior conviction proceedings occur after a
133
court enters a formal judgment against a criminal defendant.
For the purpose of the New York statute, sex trafficking is defined under
134
135
either New York state law or the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
This statute is limited to sex trafficking and does not extend to the broader
136
category of human trafficking. To move for a vacation of a prior conviction, the

likely a defendant would be unwilling to raise such a defense because of the emotional intricacies and distrust of
the legal system involved in a human trafficking situation. See supra Part III.C (discussing why an affirmative
defense, even in a jurisdiction providing one, is not an ideal form of relief for a human-trafficking victim).
127. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012) (allowing sex-trafficking
victims to seek a vacation of prior conviction); Press Release, Urban Justice Center’s Sex Workers Project,
Governor Paterson Signs First in the Nation Bill Allowing Survivors of Sex Trafficking to Clear Prostitution
Convictions (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/member_files/075/20100816/
statement.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
128. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i). Providing official documentation showing a then-existing
sex-trafficking situation creates a presumption that the defendant’s crime stems from the trafficking situation.
Id. § 440.10(1)(i)(ii). Such documentation, however, is not required for a motion to vacate under section
440.10(1)(i). Id.
129. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Crim. Ct. 2011).
130. See New York v. Doe, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481, 483 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (providing the trend in this
area of law indicates “a strong expression that those engaging in prostitution, or commercial sex, under the age
of eighteen are to be viewed as victims of trafficking, rather than perpetrators of crime.”). Treating minors
engaging in prostitution as victims rather than criminals is a growing trend in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., OR.
REV. STAT. § 12.117(d) (2011) (classifying prostitution by a minor as child abuse).
131. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 97, at 753 (“To nullify or cancel; make void;
invalidate.”).
132. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 182 (2008) (citations omitted) (Affirmative defenses are raised
to “justify, mitigate, or excuse” a crime.).
133. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 655 (2006).
134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.34 (McKinney 2008) (defining sex trafficking categorically as:
intentionally profiting from prostitution by (1) unlawfully providing drugs to a trafficked individual; (2)
“making material false statements, misstatements, or omissions to induce [the trafficked person] to engage
in . . . prostitution”; (3) withholding a trafficked person’s identification documents to “impair said person’s
freedom of movement”; (4) requiring the trafficked person to engage in prostitution for debt repayment; and (5)
using fear or force to induce the trafficked person to engage in prostitution).
135. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2006) (defining sex trafficking broadly as “the recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act”).
136. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012).
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statute requires due diligence, which is satisfied if the movant is no longer a
137
victim of sex trafficking and it is safe to make such a motion. Provided the
defendant satisfies the due diligence requirement, even if the criminal case
against him or her is still appealable, the defendant may nevertheless file a
138
motion to vacate at any time after sentencing. This statute does not require a
showing of any particular facts, which allows broad judicial discretion to
determine whether the movant has shown “he or she was a sex-trafficking
139
victim.”
Despite broad judicial discretion, the New York law is nevertheless limited,
as it only applies to prostitution or loitering for the purpose of engaging in
140
prostitution convictions stemming from the sex-trafficking situation. Therefore,
a trafficking victim who commits an offense other than these two crimes has no
141
parallel relief—under even New York’s landmark legislation. Similarly, in
142
Silvia Gonzalez’s case, the court denied her motion to vacate her prior
conviction for resisting arrest, because resisting arrest was “not a prostitution
143
related offense.” This is the state of the law even though Gonzalez successfully
144
demonstrated that she was a sex-trafficking victim at the time of that offense.
145
However, as the G.M. court noted, “a valid issue remains as to whether the
statute can be applied to non-prostitution offenses where the defendant was a
demonstrated sex-trafficking victim during their commission. [New York Penal
Law section] 440.10(6) allows the court to ‘take such additional action as is
137. Id. § 440.10(1)(i)(i).
138. See id. § 440.10(2)(b) (Where appellate review is possible, the court must deny a motion to vacate
prior convictions. However, this section explicitly does not apply to trafficking victims.); see also id. §
440.10(3)(a) (granting judicial discretion to deny a motion where the record prior to sentencing does not include
facts supportive of vacation of prior convictions. This section does not apply to trafficking victims.).
139. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Crim. Ct. 2011). “[T]he legislature did not require
any specific corroborating facts or other evidence which would to [sic] support a defendant’s application . . . .
By avoiding bright-line rules and formulaic determinations, the legislature squarely gave the Courts the
discretion to grant relief pursuant to [New York Criminal Procedure Law section] 440.10(1)(i) . . . .” Id.
140. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (allowing vacation of judgment “where the arresting
charge was under [New York Penal Law] section 240.37 (loitering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution
offense . . . ) or [New York Penal Law] 230.00 (prostitution) . . . and the defendant’s participation in the offense
was result of having been a victim of sex trafficking . . . .”). But cf. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp.
2011) (providing a defendant with “an affirmative defense for any offense committed as a direct result” of thenexisting human trafficking) (emphasis added).
141. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (applying only to prostitution or loitering for the purpose
of prostitution).
142. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
143. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
144. Id. The court did, however, vacate eighty-six prior convictions for either prostitution or loitering for
the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense. Id. at 568, 571. But cf. New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761,
766 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (vacating all six of G.M.’s prior convictions, including trespass and drug possession, even
though her two prostitution convictions were the only ones covered by the statute; this is more of a procedural
decision rather than statutory interpretation, because the prosecution consented to the vacation of these
convictions in addition to the prostitution convictions).
145. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text (describing G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761).
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146

appropriate in the circumstances[.]’” As this Comment goes to press, no New
York court had extended Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(6) to a non147
prostitution offense.
Enacting New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(1)(i) allows for
148
an increase in motions to vacate prior convictions. One may argue this will
“‘open the flood gates’ of prior prostitution convictions insofar as those
defendants can just come into court and claim that they were the victims of sex
149
trafficking . . . and have their convictions vacated.” However, the New York
150
City Criminal Court found this argument “dogmatic and unpersuasive.”
Furthermore, “even if the floodgates open by granting [vacations of prior
convictions under New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(1)(i)], the
151
Courts can easily deny frivolous motions . . . .” Additionally, the court
emphasized the importance of providing relief for a trafficking victim outweighs
the concern for any administrative burden the law may impose on the judicial
152
system.
On the one hand, New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(1)(i) is
153
very limited. The vacation statute only applies to sex trafficking, rather than all
154
instances of human trafficking; it only vacates convictions for prostitution and
loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, rather than for other crimes
155
stemming from a sex-trafficking situation. Furthermore, as trafficking victims
are likely to be wary of the court system that criminally prosecuted them, they
156
are not likely to pursue judicial relief. Even more important to this Comment,
the New York statute provides relief to a sex-trafficking victim only after the
157
victim has been arrested, charged, and criminally prosecuted. In other words,
when the criminal-justice system fails to recognize a trafficking victim as a

146. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d at 766 n.7 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 440.10(6)).
147. See id. at 762–63; see also New York v. Doe, 935 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011);
Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (vacating prior convictions for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of
prostitution).
148. See Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (referring to the prosecution’s unsuccessful argument).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. (“[T]he defendant’s ability to continue putting her life back together after [her sex
trafficking situation] heavily outweighs any increased motion practice that may result hereafter.”).
153. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text (describing the novel law’s limitations).
154. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012).
155. Id.
156. See Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570 (providing that “victims of human trafficking are often too
wary of authorities or too traumatized by their experiences to be able or willing to timely report their
victimization”); supra Part II.B (discussing why victims often do not seek help and why they may distrust the
criminal-justice system generally).
157. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (allowing a sex trafficking victim to bring a motion to
vacate prior convictions, as opposed to allowing a victim to bring an affirmative defense).
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victim, the victim slips through the cracks, and the opportunity to interrupt the
158
trafficking cycle is lost.
Despite the limited applicability of New York’s vacation statute and its
failure to combat dual victimization, the statute gives “‘victims of human
trafficking the fresh start they deserve’ by vacating criminal records that can
159
serve as barriers to employment, housing and citizenship applications.”
E. Too Little, Too Late
As this Comment goes to press, no jurisdiction has a combination of all three
of the above statutory responses to when a trafficking victim commits a crime
160
due to a then-present trafficking situation. Standing alone, any one of these
forms of relief is insufficient. While providing an affirmative defense and
vacating judgment on a showing of trafficking are important statutory changes
for all jurisdictions to adopt, they come too little, too late. By the time a case
goes to trial, the criminal-justice system already failed to recognize a humantrafficking victim and instead prosecuted the victim as a criminal perpetrator.
Therefore, while these retroactive measures are important to catch victims who
slip through the cracks, these initiatives are of secondary importance to those
combating dual victimization before it occurs—primarily, requiring human161
trafficking training for law-enforcement officers.
Mandatory-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers—a critical
162
means of combating dual victimization—is not widely implemented. As
human-trafficking victims encounter law-enforcement officers during the
163
officers’ day-to-day duties,
training officers how to recognize human
trafficking is the best strategy to combat dual victimization.
Of the forms of relief available to trafficking victims prosecuted for crimes
committed due to their trafficking situations, only a combination of all three
initiatives will combat dual victimization before it occurs and provide relief for
158. A dual victimization.
159. Noleen G. Walder, City Bar Urges Passage of Law for Sex-Trafficking Victims, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12,
2010 (quoting N.Y.C. BAR COMM. ON SEX & LAW, REPORT ON A.7670/S.4429, at 4 (Mar. 2010)).
160. See N.Y.C. BAR COMM. ON SEX & LAW, REPORT ON A.7670/S.4429, at 4 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071848-CommentonLegislationreVictimsofSexTrafficking.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing that the New York legislation is the first of its kind in the
country). As New York (the only jurisdiction with a vacation of prior judgment statute) does not have an
affirmative defense for trafficking, no jurisdiction has all three.
161. See supra Part III.B (discussing the important of human-trafficking training for law-enforcement
officers).
162. As this Comment goes to press, only seven states required human-trafficking training for lawenforcement officers: California, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §
80B.11(1)(e) (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-3 (West
2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55) (West 2012).
163. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3.
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those victims who will inevitably slip through the cracks. Therefore, this
Comment recommends a three-part statutory response to dual victimization: (1)
mandating human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers; (2) providing
human trafficking as an affirmative defense to crimes committed as a direct result
of a then-present human-trafficking situation; and (3) allowing vacation of
164
judgment upon a showing of human trafficking.
IV. COMBATING DUAL VICTIMIZATION: A PROPOSAL
This Comment argues the number of human-trafficking victims charged and
prosecuted for crimes related to their trafficking situations indicates a systemic
failure within the criminal-justice system to recognize human trafficking and its
players and prosecute accordingly. When a human-trafficking victim is arrested
and charged for crimes committed as a result of a then-present trafficking
situation, a dual victimization occurs. This dual victimization is best prevented
when law-enforcement officers know the signs of human trafficking, proactively
look for it during their day-to-day duties, and know what services the victim will
165
need to escape and maintain freedom from his or her trafficking situation.
Despite even the best training for law-enforcement officers, trafficking victims
will inevitably slip through the cracks. Therefore, it is imperative that each
jurisdiction also implement after-the-fact relief: providing human-trafficking
victims the options of raising an affirmative defense during trial or vacating a
prior judgment for crimes committed as a direct result of a then-present
trafficking situation.
A. Preventing Dual Victimization: Mandatory Human-Trafficking Training for
Law-Enforcement Officers
“In most communities police officers may be the only meaningful contact
166
citizens have with ‘the law.’” A substantial number of trafficking victims are
167
identified by police officers engaged in their day-to-day duties. Therefore, lawenforcement officers are generally in the best position to interrupt the trafficking
164. As a statutory response, each individual state would have to enact such legislation. While this may
seem untenable, a similar federal law would be an inappropriate exertion of control over the states, and would
therefore be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The Federal Government . . . may
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”)
165. See Bachar, supra note 25 (“[T]he difficulty of uncovering and investigating human trafficking
cases is often caused by a lack of training, the need for enhanced communication between local law
enforcement and victim service agencies, and the hidden nature of this crime.”).
166. See Joan Zorza, Symposium on Domestic Violence: Criminal Law: The Criminal Law of
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence 1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47 (1992) (discussing the
importance of domestic-violence training for police officers).
167. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3.
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168

cycle, and it is essential that officers know how to recognize human trafficking.
If it were mandatory for law-enforcement officers to receive human-trafficking
169
training, it is likely that an officer would have recognized Silvia Gonzalez,
170
171
172
G.M., Kelsey Collins, and Ms. Johnson as victims.
In 2007, the California Attorney General’s Office recommended a mandatory
173
human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers. However, trafficking
training is far from universally required, as only seven states require all law174
That so few
enforcement officers undergo human-trafficking training.
jurisdictions mandate human-trafficking training for law-enforcement officers is
troubling for many reasons. First, law-enforcement officers are in the best
175
position to recognize trafficking and interrupt its cycle. Failure to train officers
to recognize situations they will likely encounter during the course of their duties
is a waste of precious resources. Second, law-enforcement training absent any
statutory mandate may result in the officers receiving insufficient information on
176
the subject. In addition to ensuring law-enforcement officers are well informed
and prepared to recognize trafficking and provide victim assistance, the mobile
nature of human trafficking renders it particularly important that all law177
enforcement officers receive uniform training.
While imposing mandatory law-enforcement training is an integral step in
preventing dual victimization, this Comment recognizes it is unwieldy to
168. Id.
169. See New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (Sylvia Gonzalez had
acquired eighty-six convictions for prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution over a two-and-a-half
year period, and law enforcement never recognized her as a human-trafficking victim.).
170. See New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Crim. Ct. 2011) (G.M. had acquired six convictions.).
171. See Kelleher, supra note 9 (noting that law-enforcement officers arrested Kelsey Collins multiple
times before an officer in another state recognized her as a human-trafficking victim).
172. See Goldberg, supra note 9 (noting that Ms. Johnson acquired three convictions for prostitution
and, despite her status as a minor, law enforcement never recognized her as a trafficking victim).
173. CAL. ALLIANCE TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING & SLAVERY TASK FORCE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN
CAL.: FINAL REPORT 5 (2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/publications/Human _Trafficking_Final_Report.pdf
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The Attorney General’s Office recommended mandatory trafficking
training for other individuals likely to encounter human-trafficking victims during the course of their
employment (health professionals, service providers, and other first responders). Id.
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 80B.11 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-3
(LexisNexis 2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102(55) (West
2012).
175. Moossy, supra note 19, at 3. “Most cases prosecuted by DOJ to date have been identified by linelevel police officers who encounter sex traffickers or their victims during the normal course of operations:
during routine traffic stops, on domestic violence calls, while inspecting liquor licenses, and when intercepting
truant children.” Id.
176. See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text (examining the shortfalls of informal humantrafficking training); Bachar, supra note 25 (evidencing the insufficiencies of informal human-trafficking
training).
177. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 4 (“Sex traffickers often operate in multijurisdictional networks,
transporting their victims to various brothels, motels, communities and towns.”).
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recommend a state-by-state statutory change. However, as it would be
178
unconstitutional to impose a similar federal mandate, a state-by-state statutory
change is the only remaining option. Furthermore, as unwieldy as it may be,
mandatory domestic-violence training for law-enforcement officers progressed
through a similar state-by-state enactment; currently, twenty-five states impose
179
mandatory domestic-violence training for law-enforcement officers. Therefore,
as cumbersome as it may be, this multijurisdictional legislative progression is not
unprecedented, and domestic-violence training provides legislators with a
180
model.
1. Mandatory Domestic-Violence Training: A Model
Mandatory domestic-violence training provides a model for mandatory
human-trafficking training. While only seven states mandate human-trafficking
181
182
training for law-enforcement officers, twenty-five states mandate domestic183
violence training for all law-enforcement officers. State statutes requiring
domestic-violence training for law-enforcement officers vary in the breadth and
depth of information covered. Some statutes impose a detailed list of issues
184
arising around domestic violence to be covered in a required training. In
178. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted) (“The Federal Government . . . may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”).
179. See infra note 183 (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
180. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the progression of mandatory domestic-violence training enacted
state-by-state).
181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.14 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 80B.11 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.223 (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-3
(LexisNexis 2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-102 (LexisNexis
2012).
182. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
183. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.510 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7294g (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.1701 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6316 (2011); 50 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/7 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 80B.11(1)(a)–(b); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15.334(1)(b) (West Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(D) (West Supp. 2011); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 116A (West Supp. 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 776.22 (West 2006); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 590.040 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-927 (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20
(West 2005); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 214-b (McKinney 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-14 (2004); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 109.73 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3311.5(G) (West Supp. 20111); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 12-29-6 (2002); S.D. ADMIN. R. 2:01:08:04(5) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-8-112(37) (2003);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2365 (West 2012); VA. CODE. ANN. § 9.1-102; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.030
(West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.85(b)(1d)(a) (West Supp. 2011).
184. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519(c) (requiring law-enforcement officers to undergo a domesticviolence training covering the “nature and extent of domestic violence,” “signs of domestic violence,” “legal
rights of, and remedies to, victims of domestic violence,” “impact on children of law enforcement intervention
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contrast, some of the statutes are non-descriptive and merely require that law185
enforcement officers attend a domestic-violence training. Inherent in nondescriptive mandatory-training statutes is the danger of under-informative or
inconsistent trainings.
While only twenty-five states have mandatory domestic-violence training,
this state-by-state enactment provides a model for a similar state-by-state
mandate for human-trafficking training.
2. Mandatory Human-Trafficking Training for All Law-Enforcement
Officers
Using domestic-violence training as a model, this Comment argues that every
jurisdiction should mandate human-trafficking training for its law-enforcement
officers. Furthermore, due to the need for consistency across jurisdictions and the
186
breadth of issues arising around human trafficking, this Comment proposes a
statutory amendment imposing detailed obligations and topics to be covered,
187
188
more like the existing Indiana statute, as opposed to the vague Texas statute.
Of course, there are certain drawbacks to implementing mandatory humantrafficking training for all law-enforcement officers. First, mandating training
will have a substantial fiscal impact on each state. In addition to the initial
expense in enacting a new statute, the training itself will require initial funding
and continued maintenance. However, as many jurisdictions already require
continuing education for law-enforcement officers, requiring human-trafficking
training does not “result in increased costs” because this existing funding may
189
support human-trafficking training. Additionally, if law-enforcement officers
are trained to recognize the signs of trafficking, it is reasonable to assume that
more traffickers will be criminally prosecuted, thereby increasing pressure on the

in domestic violence,” “services and facilities available to victims and batterers,” among other topics).
185. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-14 (requiring law-enforcement officers undergo “an
education and training program . . . concerning the handling of crimes involving domestic violence,” stressing
“the enforcement of criminal laws in domestic violence cases and the use of community resources”).
186. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 4 (“Because traffickers are mobile and cross jurisdictional lines,
victim identification training must be implemented not just in one jurisdiction, but in neighboring jurisdictions
as well.”).
187. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-1-9(a)(10) (West 2008) (requiring law-enforcement officers undergo
training examining “the human and sexual trafficking laws”; “[i]dentification of human and sexual trafficking”;
“[c]ommunicating with traumatized persons”; “[t]herapeutically appropriate investigative techniques”;
“[c]ollaboration with federal law enforcement officials”; “[r]ights of and protections afforded to victims”; and
“[t]he availability of community resources to assist human and sexual trafficking victims”).
188. See TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.258 (West 2012) (requiring law-enforcement officers to take a
four-hour training “includ[ing] a review of the substance of” penal code sections defining human trafficking).
189. See County of Los Angeles v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (Ct. App.
2003) (addressing similar fiscal concerns for implementing mandatory domestic violence training, and holding
that requiring domestic violence training will not increase costs for law enforcement training as the state can use
the existing continuing education fund for law-enforcement officers).
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prison system. While the financial impact of implementing mandatory training is
a substantial burden, a cost-benefit analysis dictates that individual freedom and
justice must outweigh the fiscal impact.
Another concern with implementing mandatory human-trafficking training
for law enforcement is that there is no way to ensure consistency across state
lines. However, the same is true of mandatory domestic-violence training, yet
190
twenty-five states imposed mandatory domestic-violence training.
Perhaps the best criticism of this proposal is the argument that it is only
necessary to implement such a training program in highly trafficked-to areas.
191
However, due to the mobility of human trafficking and the issues of
underreporting and inaccurate statistics, limiting such training to only certain
192
states creates an unworkable line-drawing issue.
Therefore, despite these valid criticisms of a multi-state statutory scheme to
mandate human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement officers, the
importance of recognizing a victim of a crime and treating him or her as such
rather than as a criminal outweighs any other state interest. Mandatory humantrafficking training for law-enforcement officers is the best way to provide law
enforcement with the tools they need to recognize trafficking and interrupt the
trafficking cycle, thereby preventing dual victimization.
B. After-the-Fact Relief
Because human trafficking is so difficult to recognize, human-trafficking
victims will inevitably slip through the cracks, even with the best law193
enforcement training in place. Therefore, it is imperative that states provide
remedies for those human-trafficking survivors who slipped through the cracks of
194
the criminal-justice system, in addition to preventative measures.
This
Comment urges states to provide both an affirmative defense to criminal charges
195
and vacation of judgment on a showing of then-present human trafficking.

190. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing existing domestic violence training for law-enforcement
officers).
191. See Moossy, supra note 19, at 4 (“Sex traffickers often operate in multijurisdictional networks,
transporting their victims to various brothels, motels, communities and towns.”).
192. Should mandatory training be required only in the highest trafficked-to states? The highest
trafficked-to and neighboring states? Will such a line-drawing scheme be reviewed in the future to see if
“highly trafficked-to” states have changed?
193. See supra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties in recognizing human trafficking).
194. See infra Part IV.B.1. This Comment urges each state to enact an affirmative defense that a
criminal defendant may raise when the crime committed was a direct result of a then-present human-trafficking
situation. The trafficking victim need not show any force or threat of force to prevail on such a defense.
195. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining why both forms of relief, while important, are insufficient when
taken alone).
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1. Affirmative Defense to Criminal Charges
Providing an affirmative defense for defendants to raise during trial is an
imperative form of relief for those human-trafficking victims who slip through
196
the cracks. Currently, only eight states provide any affirmative defense, and
this Comment argues the majority of these statutes are too limited to provide
197
effective relief for human-trafficking victims. Conversely, a few of the existing
198
statutes are too broad and would apply to too many crimes.
199
In light of the existing and flawed affirmative defense statutes, this
Comment urges each state to enact an affirmative defense that a criminal
defendant may raise when the crime committed was a direct result of a then200
present human-trafficking situation. The trafficking victim need not show any
201
force or threat of force to prevail on such a defense. Furthermore, the
affirmative defense must be available to more human-trafficking victims than the
majority of the existing statutes currently allow for. Specifically, the affirmative
defense must apply to crimes other than prostitution and loitering for the purpose
202
of prostitution. This Comment recognizes that there are certain crimes to which

196. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3 (West Supp. 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e) (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m) (West Supp. 2011).
197. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (limiting the affirmative defense to charges
for prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution, thereby effectively limiting the defense to sextrafficking victims rather than the broader category of human-trafficking victims); see also IOWA CODE ANN. §
710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4) (requiring not only the direct relation between the crime committed
and the trafficking situation, but also a showing of force or threat of force); supra Part III.C (discussing the
limitations of most of the affirmative defense statutes currently available to human-trafficking victims during a
criminal trial).
198. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D) (Neither New Jersey nor
Oklahoma require the crime committed be directly related to the trafficking situation. Rather, these statutes
require only that the defendant was a human-trafficking victim at the time the crime was committed.); see also
MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 96 (recommending states enact an affirmative defense that does not have a
direct-relation requirement).
199. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 748(D); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m).
200. This statutory scheme would maintain the direct-result requirement, like Alabama, Iowa,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Texas, and Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 939.46(1m).
201. This Comment rejects the force or threat of force requirement that Iowa and Minnesota impose on a
trafficking victim attempting to raise an affirmative defense. IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.3; MINN. STAT. §
609.325(4).
202. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d) (limiting the affirmative defense to
prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution, thereby effectively limiting the defense only to victims
of sex-trafficking rather than human-trafficking victims).
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203

an affirmative defense should not apply. However, these limits must not be so
austere as to limit applicability of the affirmative defense to only one category of
204
human-trafficking victims. The proposed affirmative defense will be neither
205
too broad nor too narrow, and will provide relief to human-trafficking victims
who slip through the cracks of the criminal-justice system.
2. Vacation of Judgment on a Showing of Human Trafficking
While an affirmative defense is a necessary form of relief for a trafficking
victim charged of a crime, a trafficking victim may be unwilling at the time of
206
trial to take advantage of this relief by raising an affirmative defense.
Therefore, it is imperative—even in jurisdictions that provide an affirmative
207
defense —that states also enact a statute allowing victims to vacate a criminal
judgment upon a showing of a then-present trafficking situation.
As this Comment goes to press, only New York has a vacation-of-judgment
208
statute. The first of its kind, the statute allows broad judicial discretion, as it
209
does not require a showing of particular facts. Despite this broad judicial
discretion, New York’s statute is nevertheless too narrow, as it applies only to
210
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. Therefore, a
human-trafficking victim who commits any crime other than these two offenses
as a direct result of a then-present trafficking situation would be left without any
211
212
form of relief, even in New York. For example, in Silvia Gonzalez’s case, the
court denied her motion to vacate her prior conviction for resisting arrest,

203. Prohibiting the defense for homicide or other violent crimes, for example, would be a permissible
limitation.
204. The affirmative defense is limited to sex trafficking in the majority of jurisdictions currently
providing such a defense. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.325(4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
645:2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(d).
205. As the proposed affirmative defense statute maintains the direct-result requirement, it is not overbroad. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the proposed affirmative defense statute is not
too limited, as it does not include a force or threat of force requirement, and it is not restricted to only
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part II.B (discussing barriers human-trafficking victims encounter with the judicial
system more generally); Part III.C (discussing the potential difficulties in claiming a then-present trafficking
situation as an affirmative defense).
207. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing mandatory human-trafficking training for law-enforcement
officers); Part IV.B.1 (considering the affirmative defense against criminal charges).
208. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2012); see also supra Part III.D
(analyzing New York’s unique vacation statute).
209. New York v. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Crim. Ct. 2011). “[T]he legislature did not require
any specific corroborating facts or other evidence which would [sic] to support a defendant’s application . . . .
By avoiding bright-line rules and formulaic determinations, the legislature squarely gave the Courts the
discretion to grant relief pursuant to [New York Criminal Procedure Law section] 440.10(1)(i) . . . .” Id.
210. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i).
211. See id. (applying only to prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution).
212. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
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because resisting arrest was “not a prostitution related offense.” Therefore,
even though this crime was a direct result of a then-present trafficking situation,
214
this unique form of relief remained out of Silvia’s reach. Furthermore, by
limiting the statute’s applicability so narrowly to these two crimes, the statute
215
effectually only applies to sex trafficking, rather than human trafficking.
In light of these considerations, this Comment urges states to enact a
vacation-of-judgment statute that requires the movant show (1) the crime
committed was a direct result of (2) a then-present human-trafficking situation.
Like the New York statute, this proposed statute would not require a showing of
216
particular facts, thereby allowing broad judicial discretion. However, unlike the
New York statute, the proposed statute must not be limited solely to prostitution
or loitering for the purpose of prostitution, thereby limiting applicability to sex217
trafficking victims. Nonetheless, this Comment recognizes that there are certain
crimes to which such relief should not apply, provided those limits do not
effectively restrict the relief’s applicability to one category of trafficking
218
victims. In this way, the proposed vacation-of-judgment statute would apply to
a human-trafficking victim who committed a crime due to a then-present
trafficking situation, and would allow enough judicial discretion to provide
effective after-the-fact relief to a trafficking victim who slips through the cracks.
V. CONCLUSION
The number of human-trafficking victims charged and prosecuted for
219
crimes indicates a systemic failure within the criminal-justice system to
recognize the crime and its players, and requires statutory changes. These
220
changes must focus on both preventing dual victimization before it occurs and

213. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
214. Id.
215. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (applying only to prostitution or loitering for the purpose
of prostitution).
216. Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 570. “[T]he legislature did not require any specific corroborating facts
or other evidence which would to [sic] support a defendant’s application. . . . By avoiding bright-line rules and
formulaic determinations, the legislature squarely gave the Courts the discretion to grant relief pursuant to [New
York Criminal Procedure Law section] 440.10(1)(i) . . . .” Id.
217. Cf. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(i) (limiting the vacation of prior convictions statute to
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution).
218. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 927 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (Sylvia Gonzalez had acquired eighty-six convictions for
prostitution or loitering for the purpose of prostitution over a two-and-a-half year period, and law enforcement
never recognized her as a human-trafficking victim.); New York v. G.M., 922 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Crim. Ct. 2011)
(G.M. had acquired six convictions.); Kelleher, supra note 9 (noting that law-enforcement officers arrested
Kelsey Collins multiple times before an officer in another state recognized her as a human-trafficking victim);
Goldberg, supra note 9 (noting that Ms. Johnson acquired three convictions for prostitution and, despite her
status as a minor, law enforcement never recognized her as a trafficking victim).
220. Mandatory human-trafficking training seeks to prevent dual victimization before it occurs. See
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providing relief for those human-trafficking victims who will inevitably slip
221
through the cracks. This Comment urges states to enact a three-part statutory
response to dual victimization: (1) mandatory human-trafficking training for all
222
law-enforcement officers; (2) an affirmative defense for crimes committed as a
223
direct result of a then-present human-trafficking situation; and (3) vacation of
prior convictions on a showing that the crime committed was a direct result of a
224
then-present human-trafficking situation. Of these statutory changes, only
225
imposing mandatory law-enforcement training prevents dual victimization;
however, it is imperative that jurisdictions adopt both an affirmative defense and
a vacation of prior conviction statute to provide relief for those victims who will
inevitably slip through the cracks, even with the best human-trafficking training
in place.

supra Part IV.A (advocating each state provide mandatory human-trafficking training for law-enforcement
officers).
221. An affirmative defense and a vacation of prior convictions statute are important forms of relief for
victims who slip through the cracks. See supra Part IV.B (advocating each state provide an affirmative defense
for human-trafficking victims and provide a vacation of prior convictions statute).
222. Mandatory human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement officers prevents dual victimization.
See supra Part IV.A (advocating each state mandate human-trafficking training for all law-enforcement officers,
and that this statute detail specific topics to be covered during this training).
223. To provide relief for human-trafficking victims who slip through the cracks, jurisdictions should
have an affirmative defense that human-trafficking victims may raise during trial on a showing that the crime
committed was a direct result of a then-present human-trafficking situation. See supra Part IV.B.1 (advocating
each state provide an affirmative defense for human-trafficking victims).
224. As human-trafficking victims may be unable or unwilling to raise an affirmative defense during
trial, jurisdictions should further provide a vacation of prior convictions statute, on which an individual may
prevail on a showing that the convicted crime was a direct result of a then-present trafficking situation. See
supra Part IV.B.2 (advocating each state provide a vacation of prior convictions statute).
225. The primary issue this Comment seeks to address.
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